Civil Model Jury Charge 4.10 K. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL BILATERAL
CONTRACTS
model jury charge
Plaintiff
has alleged that the defendant promised [name
what was promised] and that plaintiff reasonably relied on that
promise.
A promise which is made without any
consideration being given by the other party sometimes can be enforced. Thus, even if nothing of value was promised
or exchanged by the party who reasonably relied on a promise, sometimes the
promise can be enforced.
To succeed on
this claim, plaintiff must prove each of the following facts:
1. That the defendant made a clear and
definite promise.[1]
2. That the defendant expected that the
promise would be relied upon.
3. That the plaintiff did reasonably rely on
the promise.
4. That the plaintiff’s reliance on the promise
caused the plaintiff to suffer a definite and substantial detriment.[2]
If plaintiff
proves all of the above conditions by a preponderance of the evidence, then you
can consider the defendant’s promise as creating a valid contract between the
parties.
[1]Promissory
Estoppel is well established in New Jersey.
E.g., Royal Assoc. v. Concannon,
200 N.J. Super. 84 (App. Div.
1985). See Spaulding v. Hussain, 229 N.J.
Super. 430, 438 (App. Div. 1988) where “the trial judge correctly charged
the elements of promissory estoppel, namely, a clear and definite promise made
with the expectation that the promisee will rely coupled with reasonable
reliance therein by the promisee to his detriment.” See also Friedman v. Tappan Development Corp., 22
N.J. 523 (1956); The Malaker Corp. v. First Jersey National Bank, 163 N.J. Super. 463 (App. Div. 1978), certif. den. 79 N.J. 488 (1979). However,
more recent decisions have tended to relax the strict requirement of a “clear
and definite” promise, particularly where the plaintiff seeks damages resulting
from detrimental reliance on promises made.
See, e.g., Pop’s Cones v. Resorts
Intern. Hotel, 307 N.J. Super.
461, 469-70, 472 (App. Div. 1997); Peck
v. Imedia, Inc., 293 N.J. Super.
151, 168 (App. Div. 1996).
[2]Peck v. Imedia, Inc., 293 N.J. Super. 151 (App. Div. 1996)
discusses the need for detrimental reliance without expressly stating that the
reliance by “substantial and definite.”
293 N.J. Super. at 165. The “definite and substantial” requirement
can be traced to Friedman v. Tappan Dev.
Corp. 22 N.J. 523, 538, (1956)
and has been reiterated in more modern cases, like Malaker, 163 N.J. Super.
at 479, and Royal Assoc., 200 N.J. Super. at 92. However, the Restatement (Second) expressly questions the continued viability of
the “substantial and definite” requirement. § 90, Reporter’s Note, at 247-48.
