Civil Model Jury Charge 4.23 DURESS model jury charge
A
contract obtained by duress can be set aside at the option of the person
against whom the duress was directed. A
contract is deemed obtained by duress if the person against whom the charge of
duress is asserted has used threats, moral compulsion, physical force or
psychological pressure to overbear the other party to the contract and thereby
deprive the other party of the exercise of free will. But the actions of the person against whom
the charge of duress is asserted must be wrongful. Actions may be wrongful if unlawful or so oppressive
under the circumstances as to compel one to do what his/her free will would
refuse. The controlling factor is the
condition of the mind of the person subjected to such kinds of coercive measures
at the time the contract is entered into.
The age, capacity, education and relationship of the parties are among
the factors you should consider in determining if there was duress.
A party entitled to set aside a
contract obtained by duress is not required to do so. When and if the duress is no longer being
asserted against him/her, he/she may at his/her option either set aside the
contract or confirm it. But once the
party makes the decision he/she cannot later change it. If the duress is no longer being asserted
against him/her, he/she must act with diligence and without delay if he/she
desires to set aside the contract.
He/She will be deemed to have confirmed the contract if after the duress
is no longer being asserted he/she (1) waits an unreasonable time to disaffirm
the contract; or (2) does any material act which assumes the transaction to be
valid; or (3) deals with the subject matter of the contract as if the contract
were still valid.[1]
Cases
and Commentary:
For definition of duress see McBride
v. Atlantic City, 146 N.J. Super. 498 (Law Div. 1974), aff’d 146 N.J. Super. 406 (App.
Div. 1975), aff’d, 72 N.J. 201 (1976); Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 20 N.J.
359 (1956); Konsuvo v. Netzke, 91 N.J. Super.
353 (Ch. Div. 1966). If a party is entitled
to void a contract by reason of duress he/she may ratify it by treating it as
valid when no longer under duress. Cf. Ajamian
v. Schlanger, 20 N.J. Super. 246 (App. Div. 1952).
