SALVATORE PUGLIA VS. ELK PIPELINE, INC., ET AL. A-0886-13T1

 SALVATORE PUGLIA VS. ELK PIPELINE, INC., ET AL. 

A-0886-13T1 

We consider the propriety of the summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14, based on his lay-off at the near completion of a public works construction project. We conclude plaintiff's claim is dependent on the interpretation of the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Accordingly, redress is governed by federal law and the state CEPA claim is preempted by section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a), and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-166. 

RAJNIKANT PATEL, ET AL. VS. KARNAVATI AMERICA, LLC, ET AL. A-2737-13T4

RAJNIKANT PATEL, ET AL. VS. KARNAVATI AMERICA, LLC, 

ET AL. 

A-2737-13T4 

In this products liability matter, we examined whether New Jersey could exercise specific jurisdiction over defendant Karnavati Engineering, Ltd., the manufacturer of a machine, whose alleged defective design caused plaintiff's injury. Karnavati is a corporation located in India, and had insufficient contacts to result in general jurisdiction. Karnavati was shown to have made a single sale of the subject machine to defendant GlobePharma, Inc. in India, using a purchase order that identified the machine was to be sold onto Neil Labs, plaintiff's New Jersey employer. The purchase order specified Neil Labs retained the right to inspect and test the 

machine prior to Globe's acceptance, and modifications suggested by Neil Labs were "of essence" for its acceptance. No evidence of any inspection or modification was produced. 

Finding these facts distinguishable, we concluded the holding in J. McIntyre Machinery, Limited v. Nicastro, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 180 L. Ed. 2d 765 (2011), addressing specific jurisdiction based upon the "stream of commerce" theory, was inapposite. We also did not find the repeated contacts found essential to the exercise of specific jurisdiction in Cruz v. Robinson Engineering Corporation, 253 N.J. Super. 66 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 9 (1992). Other than pointing to the general language in the purchase order, Globe and plaintiff failed to identify specific actions by Karnavati which demonstrate its desire to conduct business in New Jersey. 

Applying traditional jurisdictional jurisprudence, we conclude the facts do not support Karnavati purposefully availed itself of "'the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.'" Nicastro Nicastro, supra, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2787, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 774 (plurality op.) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 1298 (1958)). The totality of the contacts did not satisfy due process such that New Jersey's exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident manufacturer would "not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Ibid. (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102 (1945)). 

IN RE PETITION OF BOFI FEDERAL BANK TO ASSIGN LOTTERY PRIZE PAYMENT RIGHTS OF MICHELLE A. GLOVER PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 5:9-13 A-1694-12T3/

IN RE PETITION OF BOFI FEDERAL BANK TO ASSIGN LOTTERY PRIZE PAYMENT RIGHTS OF MICHELLE A. GLOVER PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 5:9-13 

A-1694-12T3/A-1695-12T3/A-2494-12T3/A-2689-12T3 (CONSOLIDATED) 

The court affirms the Law Division's determination that N.J.A.C. 17:20-7.9(j), which states "no one shall have the right to assign prize payments due during the last two years of the annuity term," is in accord with N.J.S.A. 5:9-13 prohibiting assignment of a lottery winner's last two annual prize payments. 

IMO INDUSTRIES, INC. V. TRANSAMERICA CORPORATION ET AL. A-6240-10T1

IMO INDUSTRIES, INC. V. TRANSAMERICA CORPORATION ET AL. 

A-6240-10T1 

This lengthy opinion addresses many issues about liability insurance coverage for asbestos-related personal injury claims and the "continuous trigger" allocation methodology established by the Supreme Court in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance Co., 138 N.J. 437 (1994), and Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance Co., 154 N.J. 312 (1998). With respect to the lead "exhaustion issue" in these appeals, we hold that insurance policies providing coverage of the insured's defense costs "outside the limits" of the indemnification coverage of the policies are exhausted by allocation of responsibility under the Owens-Illinois and Carter-Wallace methodology, and that defense costs are not payable for an indefinite time until the insurer actually makes indemnification payments reaching the limits of those policies. 

VALLEY NATIONAL BANK VS. J. RONALD MEIER, ET AL. A-0305-13T1

VALLEY NATIONAL BANK VS. J. RONALD MEIER, ET AL. 

A-0305-13T1 

The court held that defendant's pay off of a first mortgage – assigned to him rather than discharged – merged into defendant's ownership of the burdened property and, if anything, preserved only defendant's right to reimbursement from his wife, the cotenant. Accordingly, the trial judge correctly determined that the plaintiff-bank, which foreclosed on the second mortgage, was entitled to a post-judgment order barring defendant's demand for relief from the bank on the assigned first mortgage. 

R. NEUMANN & CO. VS. CITY OF HOBOKEN, ET AL. A-2775-12T1

R. NEUMANN & CO. VS. CITY OF HOBOKEN, ET AL. 

A-2775-12T1 

This appeal concerns a resolution delineating an area in need of rehabilitation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-14, a provision of the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (LRHL), 

N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to -49. Because the resolution, on its face, raises a significant question as to whether the resolution is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable due to the governing body's disregard or misunderstanding of the statutory standard upon which it relied, we vacate the resolution without prejudice to reconsideration in conformity with the law. 

ADS Associates Group, Inc. v. Oritani Savings Bank (A-114-11;

 ADS Associates Group, Inc. v. Oritani Savings Bank 

(A-114-11; 069987) 

Allen may not assert a UCC Article 4A claim against Oritani because he is not a bank “customer” under the statute. Allen also may not assert a common law negligence claim against Oritani because such a claim would contravene the objectives of Article 4A. Even if Article 4A did not bar Allen’s negligence claim, no “special relationship” existed to create a duty of care between Oritani and Allen under City Check Cashing, 166 N.J. 49. 

Janet Henebema v. South Jersey Transportation Authority (A-7-13;

Janet Henebema v. South Jersey Transportation Authority (A-7-13; 072545) 

The individual defendants’ liability and plaintiff’s comparative negligence are not intertwined with the issues to be determined on remand and therefore do not need to be considered by the jury at the retrial. The purpose of the retrial is to have the jury determine, from the evidence, whether the public entities’ employees were performing either ministerial or discretionary actions. Once the appropriate standard 

is identified, the jury can determine, based upon the applicable standard, whether the public-entity defendants are liable. 

C.A. v. Eric Bentolila, M.D. (a-32-12

C.A. v. Eric Bentolila, M.D. (a-32-12; 071702) 

The Hospital’s evaluative process in this case conformed to the Patient Safety Act’s requirements. The memorandum at issue is privileged, not subject to discovery, and should not be used for any purpose in this case. 

Beverly Maeker v. William S. Ross (A-1-13;

Beverly Maeker v. William S. Ross (A-1-13; 072185) 

The 2010 Amendment to the Statute of Frauds, N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h), does not render oral palimony agreements that predate it unenforceable because the Legislature did not intend the Amendment to apply retroactively. 

Patricia Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P. (A-64-12

Patricia Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P. (A-64-12; 072314) 

An arbitration provision – like any comparable contractual provision that provides for the surrendering of a constitutional or statutory right – must clearly and unambiguously notify the consumer that he or she is waiving the right to seek relief in a court of law. The arbitration agreement in this case is unenforceable because it failed to notify plaintiff that, by entering into the agreement, she was surrendering her right to seek relief in a judicial forum.