Civil Court Rules and Jury Charges

Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, P.C.
2053 Woodbridge Avenue - Edison, NJ 08817

Sunday, August 12, 2007

6.14 PROXIMATE CAUSE -- WHERE THERE IS A CLAIM OF INTERVENING OR SUPERSEDING CAUSES FOR JURY'S CONSIDERATION

NOTE TO JUDGE:


This charge should be given in conjunction with MCJC 7.12 or 7.13 where there is also a jury question as to whether an intervening or superseding cause brought about the injury or harm.

In this case, the [name of defendant or other party] claims that the accident/incident/event or plaintiff's injury/loss/harm was caused by an independent intervening cause and, therefore, that [name of defendant or other party] was not a contributing factor to the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm.

An intervening cause is the act of an independent agency that destroys the causal connection between the defendant's [or other party's] negligence and the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm. To be an intervening cause the independent act must be the immediate and sole cause of the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm. The intervening cause must be one that so completely supersedes the operation of the [name of defendant or other party]'s negligence that you find that the intervening event caused the acci

dent/incident/event or injury/loss/harm, without the [name of defendant or other party]'s negligence contributing to it in any material way.(1) In that case liability will not be established because [name of defendant or other party]'s negligence is not a proximate cause of the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm.

However, the [name of defendant or other party] would not be relieved from liability for his/her/its negligence by the intervention of acts of third persons, if those acts were reasonably foreseeable. By that I mean, that the causal connection between the [name of defendant or other party]'s negligence and the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm is not broken if the intervening cause is one that might, in the natural and ordinary course of things, be anticipated as not entirely improbable.(2) Where the intervention of third parties is reasonably foreseeable, then there still may be a causal connection between the defendant's [or other party's] negligence and the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm. The fact that there were interven ing causes that were foreseeable or that were normal incidents of the risk created does not relieve the defendant of liability.(3)

You must determine whether the alleged intervening cause was an intervening cause that destroyed the substantial causal connection between the defendant's negligent actions (or omissions) and the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm. If it did, then the [name of defendant or other party]'s negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident/incident/event or injury/loss/harm.



(1)Davis v. Brooks, 280 N.J. Super. 406, 412 (App. Div. 1993).




(2)Id.




(3)Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. at 203; Cruz-Mendez v. ISU, 156 N.J. 556 (1999).


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Model Civil Jury Charges